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The Impact of Institutional Settings on 
Learning Behavior by Venture Capitalists and Start-Ups 
 
Keywords: Adaptation, institutions, learning, new economy, start-ups, venture capita-
lists 
 
Abstract  
Our paper reports research from the emerging institutional field of venture capitalists in 
Europe. In Europe venture capitalism began to emerge about ten years ago, and thus, in 
Europe the phenomenon has the characteristics of emergence and novelty, as a local in-
dustry venture capitalists have yet to develop distinctive characteristics. The European 
countries do not constitute a homogeneous institutional environment, but must be per-
ceived as different local settings, and thus, venture capitalism may evolve into different 
forms in the various parts of Europe. The objective is to understand if and how differen-
ces in local institutional settings affect learning and adaptation by European venture ca-
pitalists and start-ups, and thus, affect the processes of field formation. For example, it 
has been observed that institutional settings can facilitate or discourage learning from 
direct experience (Herriot et al., 1985). Thus, depending on the institutional settings 
venture capitalists and start-ups may rely on diffusion of experience in various degrees. 
Experiences can diffuse from the US, where venture capitalism as an entrepreneurial 
form evolved in Silicon Valley in the 1970s. In the US venture capitalists represent an 
institutionalized type of organization with formalized rules and standards, codified be-
havior and roles (Suchman, 1995; Suchman et al., 2001). European venture capitalists 
and start-ups may imitate behavior and rules developed in Silicon Valley, and thus, a 
second research objective is to understand if and how US venture capitalism affect the 
evolvement of venture capitalism in Europe. 
We study the emergence of a venture capitalist industry in Denmark and Italy, and thus, 
by selecting two countries with distinctive differences in cultures and institutions, we 
study learning and adaptation by venture capitalists and start-ups in different institutio-
nal settings. We suggest that venture capitalists and start-ups perceiving institutional 
settings as non venture-friendly are more likely to rely on learning by imitation than on 
trial-and-error learning. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The new economy, knowledge and learning are powerful concepts of our time, and it is 
widely accepted that creating, possessing and utilizing knowledge is a key to competiti-
ve advantage of firms. However, creating, possessing and utilizing knowledge are not 
without problems for firms and entrepreneurs operating in an uncertain world full of 
surprises. Because, in quickly changing environments knowledge is often subject to dis-
tortion and the future is difficult to predict, and therefore, little is known about what 
knowledge will be relevant in the future. 
In the new economy the pace of change constantly increases, as firms and entrepreneurs 
constantly discover new aspects of the technologies and develop new ideas for how and 
where to apply them. Furthermore, the population of actors in the new economy con-
stantly grows as the costs of the hardware, the software and the Internet access needed 
to establish start-ups within the industry constantly decrease. Hence, the economic bar-
riers to entry for new actors are low, making it is possible for far more actors to develop 
and distribute, for example, software applications. As the population of actors in the 
new economy constantly grows then many more new ideas, good and bad, are put for-
ward, and therefore, it is impossible to foresee from where the next new good idea will 
emerge, what will be the source of the idea and what it will be. As Axelrod and Cohen 
(1999, p. xi) noted: 
 
"In a world where many players are all adapting to each other and where the emer-
ging future is extremely hard to predict, what actions should you take?" 
 
Hence, the new economy is characterized by competition on time-to-market and the 
firstcomer advantage seems so advantageous that in some sectors the firstcomer takes 
the most. As noted by Teece (1998, p. 58): 
 
"In winner-take-all or winner-take-the-lion's-share contexts, there is a heightened 
payoff associated with getting the timing right (one can be too early or too late) and 
with organizing sufficient resources once opportunity opens up. Very often, compe-
tition is like a high-stakes game of musical chairs. Being well positioned when 
standards gel is essential. The associated styles of competition are, as Brian Arthur 
(1988) points out, much like casino gambling."  
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 In a world marked by uncertainty and change quick learning and adaptation are impor-
tant for firms and entrepreneurs attempting to survive, as they must constantly figure 
out what to do next. However, quickly changing environments undermine the opportu-
nities for learning, as under uncertainty and change actors will experience difficulties in 
understanding what actions coursed feedback and if any relationship exists between ac-
tion and feedback. Axelrod and Cohen (1999, p. xi) refer to such environments as com-
plex adaptive systems, characterizing them as follows: 
 
“In Complex Adaptive Systems there are often many participants, perhaps even ma-
ny kinds of participants. They interact in intricate ways that continually reshape 
their collective future. New ways of doing things - even new kinds of participants - 
may arise, and old ways - or old participants - may vanish.” 
 
As a result learning cycles are often incomplete (March and Olsen, 1976), and thus, in 
the new economy firms and entrepreneurs face serious obstacles to learning and they 
may become slow and poor learners. When firms and entrepreneurs are slow and poor 
learners new knowledge and new patterns of behavior are likely to emerge as they imi-
tate other firms and entrepreneurs. 
Based on these two observations the paper first discusses the processes of learning and 
adaptation, as well as the problems caused by the quickly and uncertain environment fa-
cing firms and entrepreneurs acting in the new economy. Thereafter the paper considers 
differences in institutional settings as sources of differences in learning and adaptation. 
By institutional settings we refer to legal environment, entrepreneurial traditions and ha-
bits, roles played by the public sector, market efficiency and financial sector. In particu-
lar, we want to analyze if there are substantial differences between Italy and Denmark 
in: tax exemption and incentives; bankruptcy law; dominant company model (family 
firm, public company, etc.); public subsidies and supports; loan availability and market 
efficiency. We investigate how these differences are perceived and how they impact on 
learning behavior by venture capitalists and start-ups. 
As its empirical foundation the paper reports from studies of learning and adaptation by 
venture capitalists and start-ups in Italy and Denmark, however this version of the paper 
only reports empirical data from Italy. The study was designed as a longitudinal trac-
king of behavioral and environmental dimensions for each organization studied. Based 
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on these empirical data we analyze learning and adaptation by several organizations in 
each country and discuss the some preliminary findings regarding the role of institutions 
as environments for entrepreneurial activities in the new economy. 
 
II. Learning from Direct Experience and Learning by Imitation 
 
The learning and adaptation process is widely studied in literature. Our interpretation of 
organizational learning is based on the assumption that organizations follow the logic of 
appropriateness (March, 1994; 1999) more than the logic of consequentiality. Following 
Levitt and March (1988) studying organizational learning means understanding how or-
ganizations learn from direct experience and how organizations learn from experience 
of others. “In a social environment, learning from direct experience is supplemented by 
the diffusion of experience, that is, by imitating others” (Herriott et al., 1985, p. 299). 
Learning by imitating means learning from the experience of others. “From a rational 
perspective, imitating can be seen as a way of increasing (on average) the amount of ex-
perience from which an individual draws while decreasing (on average) the linkage be-
tween that individual’s situation and the experience base action. From a behavioral per-
spective, it can be seen as a standard way by which adaptive systems deal with uncer-
tainty and ambiguity” (Herriott et al., 1985, p. 299) 
For the purpose of operationalizing the notion of learning by imitating, we refer to the 
social learning theory of Bandura (1977), which emphasizes the importance of obser-
ving and modeling the behaviors, attitudes, and reaction of others. Bandura (1977, p. 
22) states: “Learning would be exceedingly laborious, not to mention hazardous, if peo-
ple had to rely solely on the effects of their own actions to inform them what to do. For-
tunately, most human behavior is learned observationally through modeling: from ob-
serving others one forms as idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later oc-
casions this coded information serves as a guide for action”. Social learning theory ex-
plains human behavior in terms of continuous reciprocal interaction between cognitive, 
behavioral and environmental influences. Bandura’s (1977) major premise is that we 
can learn by observing others. He uses the term “modeling” to describe Campbell’s two 
midrange processes of response acquisition (observation of another’s response and mo-
deling), and he claims that modeling can have as much impact as direct experience. We 
apply to our organizational behavior study some principles from the social learning 
theory, which is a general theory of human behavior. In particular, we adopt the varia-
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bles validated by Bandura’s studies to design the interview guide and the questionnaire 
used to investigate the learning process adopted by our informants. Social learning theo-
ry postulates three necessary stages: attention, retention, and motivation. According to 
Bandura, an event or procedure grabs attention because it is simple, distinctive, preva-
lent, useful, and depicted positively. These items are used as indicators in our inter-
views and observations.  
Bandura says that learning from vicarious observation allows people to decrease costly 
or fatal mistakes. A similar logic supports the exploration/exploitation trade-off propo-
sed by March (1991). In contrast to classical learning theory, Bandura affirms that the 
action, acquired by imitation, will lie dormant, available for future use, as long as we 
remember it or as long as a failure or unsuccessful experience does not define it as ne-
gative (Levitt and March, 1988). Following Bandura (1977), we store events in two 
ways: through visual images and through verbal codes. “The highest level of observa-
tional learning is achieved by first organizing and rehearsing the modeled behavior 
symbolically, and then enacting it overtly” (Bandura, 1977, p. 27). Starting from this 
theoretical framework, we investigate the retention process of our informants from co-
des, standardized procedure or slogan adopted by the organization. The third stage in 
the social learning process described by Bandura involves the motivation. Bandura uses 
the term “motivation” to refer to the rewards and punishments. We observe many forms 
of behavior in others that we never perform ourselves. Without sufficient motivation, 
we never adopt that observed behavior. Adopting this theoretical framework and consi-
dering different learning situation, we investigate if our informants prefer learning by 
imitating or by doing. 
 
III. Institutional Settings and Entrepreneurial Behavior in the New Economy 
 
We want to understand how different institutional settings affect learning behavior in 
the new economy, and thus, we develop an institutional theory framework. Research 
drawn from economic and organizational disciplines inform our reasoning on this issue. 
Institutional theories have been used to explain both the increasing homogeneity of or-
ganizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and the processes of differentiation across 
national boundaries (Jepperson and Meyer, 1991; Orru’ et al., 1991). This theoretical 
dilemma seems worthy of attention since “to have predictive value, institutional theory 
ultimately must be able to specify ex ante when norms and institutions will promote iso-
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morphism and when they will structure and sustain differentiation” (Baron et al., 1999). 
We focus on one internal mechanism that promotes isomorphism: learning by imitation 
(Herriot et al., 1985), and we try to explain how institutional settings affect the learning 
mechanism. We adopt the general definition of institutions suggested by Scott (1995, p. 
33): 
 
“Institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities 
that provide stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by 
various carriers – cultures, structures, and routines-and they operate at multiple le-
vels of jurisdiction.” 
 
Behind this general definition, several varieties of institutional theory lay. They differ in 
the level at which they are applied. Scott identified six categories: the levels of world 
system, societal, organizational field, organizational population, organization, and orga-
nizational subsystem. For each level, Scott identified three pillars: normative, regulati-
ve, and cognitive (1995, p. 49). Theorists emphasizing the cognitive pillars start from a 
social constructionist set of assumptions. Theorists focusing on the regulative pillar em-
brace a social realist ontology and a rational choice logic of action. Theorists stressing 
the normative pillar fall between these two areas. We argue that all these theoretical 
contributions give useful insights in explaining how institutional setting differences and 
perceptions impact on learning behavior. Mezias (1990) studied changes in normative 
beliefs regarding financial reporting requirements for corporations caused by the actions 
of state agents and professional accounting societies. Explaining these comparative dif-
ferences requires linking the institutional economics literature to the organizational lite-
rature. This not only allows us to better understand national institutional factors that 
promote or inhabit the formation of start-ups (Chesbrough, 1999), but even how these 
factors affect their learning behavior. National institutional factors, in fact, affect the le-
vel of organizational constraints. Several scholars had approached this problem. Meyer 
and Rowan (1977, p. 340) stated that “organizations are driven to incorporate the practi-
ces and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work 
and institutionalized in society.” DiMaggio and Powell (1983) emphasized that institu-
tionalization processes eventually lead to isomorphism. Despite the emphasis the au-
thors put on the topic, this aspect of institutional theory has been treated empirically on-
ly in recent years. DiMaggio (1991) studied the construction of the U.S. Art Museums 
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organizational field, and Galaskiewicz (1991) explored the institutionalization of corpo-
rate public service activity in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Edelman et al. (1999) studied the 
intersection between court decisions, professional work, and organizational practices in 
the case of EEO grievance procedure. They develop a model of institutionalization whe-
re professions, legislative bodies and organizations influence the formation of institutio-
nalized practices. This study unveils the fictive nature of the rational myths diffused by 
the professions, but also show how socially constructed rationality may over time pro-
duce market benefits “as courts recognize and legitimate organizational practices and 
hold that they may protect organizations from liability” (Edelman et al., 1999, p. 449). 
In another line of institutional research, Meyer and collaborators emphasize the role of 
the policy in shaping the institutionalization process: “formal organizing depends on 
modern policy. Organizing is everywhere largely a precipitate of this policy and part of 
the substructure of the rationalized society it builds” (Jepperson and Meyer 1991). Jep-
person and Meyer (1991) distinguish among four main types of modern rationalized po-
licy: liberal/individualist, statist society, segmental (state outside of society), and corpo-
ratist. Organizations in different policies will differ in terms of amount of formal orga-
nizing, domains of organizing, types of structures employed, and form of interpenetra-
tion of formal organizing with policy and society. For instance, Orru’ et al. (1991) 
found that business groups in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan show high degree of 
isomorphism within each country, but are very different between them. Dobbin (1994) 
compared the development of industrial policy in the railway industry in the United 
States, Britain, and France, and showed how the three countries, faced with the same set 
of problems, developed very different policies and solutions. He argues that the insti-
tutions developed to organize economic life were developed along the lines of the prin-
ciples used to organize political life. In the United States, for instance, free market beca-
me the organizing principle of the railway system. In Britain entrepreneurs rather than 
markets became the main actors in the industrial policy process. In France, the main ac-
tor was the state, whose different institutions guided the evolution and operation of the 
railways. Krasner (1983) has examined the circumstances surrounding the development 
of common normative frameworks at the international level. 
Differences between the “institutional environments” (North, 1990) imply differences in 
the way firms approach strategy. Institutional conditions affect innovation, from the 
perspectives of the decision processes within the firm and the external resources availa-
ble to the industry. We can also say that it is possible to identify different national inno-
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vation systems that imply different behavior at organizational level. The concept of na-
tional innovation system is not new (Nelson, 1993, 1994; Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1993; Mowery, 1992; Hill, 1995). It has developed from economics as a way of viewing 
the technical advance of industry in different countries. Nations differ in their institutio-
nal environments, and differences in these “national innovation systems” (Nelson, 1993, 
1994) persist over time (Nelson, 1993). Moreover, these institutional differences can 
condition the effect of learning and adaptation within firms in different nations, even 
within the same industry. They do so in part by influencing the levels of the incentive 
and appropriability constraints. A variety of national factors fall under the rubric of “in-
stitutional environment”. North (1990), for example, includes formal factors, such as 
the degree of recognition for property rights, and informal factors, such as “the rules of 
the game”. Mowery and Rosenberg (1993) extend consideration to government finan-
cing and procurement. Moreover, such an extensive view of national institutions is hard 
to test empirically and difficult to probe with counterfactual reasoning. An alternative 
approach to the impact of “institutions” is to identify and isolate a few specific factors 
in the institutional environment, and examine their impact upon firms. This parsimo-
nious approach is consistent with the view of Aoki (1994), which argues that compara-
tive analysis of the US vs. Japan should pay attention to a system of attributes, rather 
than considering single attributes in isolation. The institutional factors he considers to 
be of primary importance are: the characteristics of the capital market; the characteri-
stics of the labor market; and what he terms “the supply market” (Aoki, 1994). Ches-
brough (1999) identified three factors influencing innovation process: the fluidity or 
rigidity of the technical labor market, the amount and structure of venture formation ca-
pital, and the prevalence of pre-existing buyer-supplier linkages between firms. While 
these economic and organizational perspectives have each increased our understanding 
of innovation, neither literature has had a discernable impact upon the other. Moreover, 
the United States typically is the setting in which these effects are observed. Even if the-
re are some comparative studies Darby and Zucker (1996) showed that similarity talen-
ted “star” scientists in the US are much more likely to be involved in forming new busi-
ness than are their Japan counterparts in biotechnology. The authors outline that when 
new entry occurs, it is generally from start-ups in the US, and from extension of exi-
sting business in Japan. Such comparative differences suggest that the organizational 
process of learning cannot be understood unless the national institutional setting in 
which the firms operate is taken into account. From this it follows that there is reason to 
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believe that differences in institutional settings produce variations in learning behavior 
by firms and entrepreneurs. More precisely, it is observed that institutional settings can 
facilitate or discourage learning from direct experience (Herriott et al., 1985). Thus, de-
pending on the institutional setting entrepreneurs and venture capitalists may rely more 
on “diffusion of experience, that is, (on) imitating others” in various degrees. However, 
institutional settings do not produce isomorphism on their own. Isomorphism emerges 
as actors interpret the institutional settings in a certain way and act on their interpreta-
tions. Hence, we suggest: 
 
Proposition: Firms and entrepreneurs that perceive institutional settings as non venture-
friendly are more likely to rely on learning by imitation than by trial-and-error learning. 
 
IV. Research Design and Method 
 
Our example of the new economy is the IT industry, as we find the fast pace of change 
within this industry to be a key driver in the new economy. About this Mendelson and 
Pillai (1998, p. 415) note: 
 
“The rate of change in the industry’s external environment, including developments 
in technology, consumer preferences, and market conditions, by far exceeds that of 
other industries.” 
  
In order to gather the empirical data needed to test the proposition we designed an ex-
ploratory case study (Yin, 1984). We designed two case studies representative of two 
European countries: Italy and Denmark. In both countries the diffusion of venture capi-
talistm is relatively recent. This entrepreneurial form, developed in the Silicon Valley in 
the 1970s, has been recognized as one of the most important facilitators of the new eco-
nomy. In the American new economy, the venture capitalist is a clearly institutionalized 
type of organization with formalized rules and standards, codified behavior and role 
(Suchman, 1995). In Europe the diffusion of this kind of organization started about ten 
years ago. Thus, the diffusion of the “start-up phenomenon” in Europe has a characteri-
stic of novelty. The “new economy” is “new” only for the European region, but is alrea-
dy “old” (in term of institutionalized rules) in the United States. These rare circumstan-
ces allow us to study the learning behavior of firms and entrepreneurs from a different 
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perspective. Actually, start-ups and venture capitalists in this first stage of the European 
new economy has an additional learning source compared with their corresponding 
Americans. They can rely on the latter’s experience. This implies that European organi-
zations can learn by imitating behavior and rules developed in Silicon Valley. Selecting 
two European case studies we analyzed learning behavior by venture capitalists and 
start-ups in different institutional settings. 
We gathered information on the perspectives of two levels of the management hierarchy 
in venture capitalists and start-ups. We also incorporated into the analysis the impact of 
institutional settings (only Italian case study, so far). 
 
IV.i The Italian Case 
 
We identified one of the most representative venture capitalists in Italy, and selected 
two start-ups from its portfolio, one with a successful record (Itadiego) and one with a 
problematic record (Itamiche). Both start-ups compete in the same sector. This allows 
us to focus on similarities and difference at organizational level instead of making an 
industry level comparison. Table 1 describes the three Italian cases. 
 
Table 1 
Description of Case Data 
 Strategic Profile Total Interviews Founder-level Top Management-level 
ItaVenture VC invest in start-
up and early stage 
high tech, internet, 
wireless, hardware, 
software 
7 5 2 
Itadiego B2B software 
start-up  
3 1 2 
Itamiche Database software 
start-up 
4 2 2 
 
IV.ii The Danish Case 
 
In Denmark we identified one of the most prominent venture capitalists (DanVenture). 
The CEO of this firm is a former entrepreneur with a rather successful record. From its 
portfolio we selected a five start-ups and conducted interviews with managers in all or-
ganizations. Hence, the Danish sample of interviewees differs from the Italian. Table 2 
describes the Danish cases. 
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 Table 2 
Description of Case Data 
 Strategic Profile Total interviews Founder-level Top Management-level 
DanVenture VC focus on the 
global network 
economy. Identify 
and develop young 
companies within 
selected IT market 
segments. 
2 0 2 
Fantastic Mu-
sic Universe 
FMU 
Digital sheet music  1 0 1 
Direct Hedge Online derivatives 
broker 
1 0 1 
Netpoint High-speed 
internet access in 
hotel rooms 
1 0 1 
Tentake Supplier of 
marketing 
communication 
intelligence 
1 1 0 
Travis Online travel 
broking 
1 0 1 
 
IV.iii Data Collection 
 
We collected data through interviews, questionnaires, observations, and secondary sour-
ces. The primary source was semi-structured interviews with individual respondents. At 
each site we interviewed two types of respondents: founders of the venture capitalist 
and start-ups financed by the former (founder level interview); CEO and COO of the 
venture capitalist, and CEO and CTO of start-ups (top management-level interview). 
The Italian analysis is based upon interviews with 14 key persons: five venture capital 
founders and three start-up founders, and the top management of these firms. We con-
ducted interviews during several day site visits to the companies. Interviews typically 
lasted 60 minutes, although a few ran as long as two hours. During the site visit we kept 
a record of impressions and recorded informal observations made as we participated in 
activities such as lunches, quarterly Board dinners, coffee breaks, company soccer game 
and product demonstrations. In addition, whenever possible, we attended meetings as 
passive note takers. These observations provided real-time data. 
We used two interview guides to conduct the two levels of semi-structured interviews. 
In both cases, we asked respondents open-ended questions that let them tell their stories 
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of how they have decided to explore new solutions vs. exploit validate ones, or how 
they acquired new competence and capabilities. We asked probing questions to esta-
blish details (for example, when a particular event occurred). The founder-level inter-
view guide had four sections. It began with the background of the respondent and the 
competitive sector. The second part of the interview focused on perceived differences in 
institutional setting that had an impact in the decision of founding a company. The third 
part concentrated on the information gathering and decision making process. The final 
part of the interview was a structured questionnaire that asked respondents to give nu-
merically scaled responses to identify characteristics of their behavior in critical cir-
cumstances. The top-management level interview guide had three sections. It began 
with the personal background of the respondents and the way in which they had a con-
tact with the company. In the second part of the interview the question focused on how 
they take a strategic decision. The third section presented questions asked respondents 
to give numerically scaled responses to characterize their critical behavior in front of 
unexpected circumstances. 
 
V. Analysis of the Impact of Institutions in the New Economy 
 
We analyzed the empirical data by first comparing them across cases to construct a con-
ceptual framework (Eisenhardt, 1989). Using interviews and secondary sources, we 
wrote small case studies for each site. Having constructed the cases we then analyzed 
them. 
 
V.i Institutional Settings and Learning Processes 
 
For this part of the study we looked at how entrepreneurs and venture capitalists percei-
ve institutional factors. Thus, we tried to bring the observation point inside the organi-
zation. Studying how these factors identified by the literature influenced learning beha-
vior in new venture and business. 
What emerged from our data were insights that linked institutional settings perceived as 
non venture-friendly with a prevalent learning by imitating behavior. We defined non 
venture-friendly institutional settings as our informants did, in terms of absence of “in-
stitutions” recognized as facilitator of new private enterprises and presence of penaliza-
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tions (negative attributes) for non-successful entrepreneurial projects. Table 31 presents 
a summary of these data. We supplemented these data with a questionnaire in which in-
formants were asked to rate the level of agreement on propositions that we based on the 
literature. We used a five-points Likert scale to rate the propositions. We also gathered 
qualitative assessments from note taking during the site visit. We assessed the negative 
characteristics using the same process. We asked informants to describe the conditions 
that discourage an entrepreneur starting new venture or that discourage a venture capita-
list’s financing high-risk (or high innovation) projects. Then, we asked to determine 
whether each condition was present in their environment. Table 4 reports some results. 
We used a questionnaire to ask informants to express their agreement on the presence of 
feature that the literature considers disincentive for new venture. We used a five-points 
Likert scale to rate the level of agreement on the statements, summarized using the mo-
de as reported in table 5. 
As emerged from these data, on average our informants identify the environment in 
which they operate as non venture-friendly. For start-ups interviewed, in the business 
environment where they act only 32% of the venture-friendly features are present. But 
65.2% of the non venture-friendly features are declared as present in the business en-
vironment. From the venture capitalist point of view, the situation is less negative. Ven-
ture capitalists declared that in their business environment are present 50% of the featu-
res characterizing a venture-friendly environment and the 50% of the feature that they 
used to define a non venture-friendly environment.  
 
Table 3 
Summary of Data on Venture-friendly environment 
Case Features of a venture-friendly 
environment and Presence of venture-
friendly features (√) 
Conditions that encouraged your new 
venture/investments 
ItaVenture ° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
Merger & Acquisition by corporate  
Efficient exit strategies 
Accessible Funds raising 
Trustable relationships with 
institutional investors 
Information and knowledge access 
Reactive and efficient Equity market 
? Good University/Research Center 
Cultural Heterogeneity 
Legal and public system promoting 
new venture 
? Good business ideas to invest in 
a) The Silicon Valley example/model 
b) Founders (“we are closed friends; we 
know very well each other; we have 
different experiences that make us a good 
team”) 
c) Trustable relationships with the investors 
to create the fund 
d) More dynamic market (“we had the 
feeling that it was the right time to create 
something new) 
e) Network of people with good business 
ideas to start 
                                                 
1 In table 3 and 4 the features presented in red are those present in the Italian environment. 
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 f) Our experience in evaluating projects 
g) International background 
 
Itadiego ° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
no ”red tape trap” (low bureaucracy in 
starting and managing a new company 
in terms of obligations, permissions, 
declarations, documents, records, etc) 
efficient bank&loan system 
easy funds raising (venture capital 
market) 
° non unionized labor market 
? Long term investors relationships 
Political stability 
° tax exemption 
? infrastructure dedicated to start up 
businesses  
? valuable and trustable human resources 
° non-penalizing legal system  
h) buyer-supplier ties 
A good business idea 
A good team to realize my business idea 
Entry of venture capital firms in the 
financial market; easier access to funds 
(“For the first time in Italy you can start 
your business without money, and without 
bank constraints. I was excited . This is 
really new in our country. No family loan, 
no bank: a dream!”) 
More infrastructure dedicated to new 
company 
Silicon Valley benchmark 
 
 
Itamiche ° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
no “red tape trap” 
efficient & flexible labor market 
effective governance practice (Board 
of Directors has to play an effective 
instead of symbolic role) 
government financing 
? entrepreneurial tradition 
° tax exemption and incentives 
? easy access to information 
efficient equity market 
? entrepreneurial network 
educational system linked with the job 
market 
easy fund raising 
incentive to R&D 
? valuable technical labor market 
novelty of our business idea 
co-founder 
Access to incubator company 
Market Euphoria 
Investors 
Trustable relationship with main venture 
capitalist 
Increasing Internet Diffusion  
New economy model (“we knew that our 
business idea couldn’t be interesting one 
year later”) 
 
Table 4 
Summary of Data on Venture-adverse environment 
Case Features of a venture-adverse 
environment and Presence of venture-
adverse features (√)) 
Conditions that discouraged your new 
venture/investments 
ItaVenture √ Inefficient equity market 
√ Difficult exit strategies 
√ Bureaucracy  
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
No Funds 
No good business ideas/low 
entrepreneurial culture 
√ Penalizing tax system 
? Risk-adverse culture 
? No infrastructure 
Absence of Research Center 
No cooperation between economic 
actors 
Inefficient information flow 
Italian Equity Market (“we have to think 
about different exit strategy; IPO is not so 
easy in Italy) 
Bureaucracy 
The Italian risk-adverse culture 
(“Sometimes smart scientists prefer sell 
their idea to the University instead of 
starting their own company”) 
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? Penalizing Bankruptcy law 
 
Itadiego ? Difficult funds raising 
? Inefficient banking system 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
Insufficient infrastructure 
? High tax pressure 
? Bureaucracy 
Not receptive market 
Industry concentration 
? Rigid Labor Market 
i) Adverse legal and public system 
Low technical knowledge 
? Risk-adverse culture 
  
Tax pressure 
Bankruptcy and Failure Penalization 
(“When I decided to start my own 
business I was scared. In Italy if you fail, 
if you go bankrupt, you have a lot of 
problems in finding a new job position”) 
Bureaucracy 
  
Itamiche ° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
° 
Difficult funds raising 
? High (>40) Entrepreneurs’ average age  
? High tax pressure 
? Bureaucracy  
Low IT (internet) penetration 
Insufficient Technical Labor Market 
? Unionized Labor Market 
? Provincial culture 
No infrastructure 
No cooperation between Research 
center and private company 
Short term relationship with suppliers 
? Adverse legal system 
 
Bureaucracy 
Conformist Italian Culture (“Our business 
idea is innovative. Basically, we suggest 
to use internet instead of going to speak 
with a person in a office. Well, this means 
saving time and money. But in a 
conformist Italian culture it is not easy 
turn into social innovation, change 
habits”. “Italy is very conservative in 
business. Ifyou are young, it is very 
difficult to find someone that wants make 
business with you. Except if you are the 
owner’s son!! In Italy there is a strong 
business family tradition.) 
 
Table 5 
Summary of Data on institutional statements agreement 
Statements Level of Agreement *(mode) 
Low tax pressure facilitates new business 5 
Free Market facilitates new business 5 
Liberal society promotes new business 4 
Government Financing promotes new business 4 
Flexible Labor Market facilitates start up 5 
Effective banking system facilitates new business 5 
Venture Capital Market promotes start up 4 
Efficient Equity Market facilitates start up 5 
Family firm tradition facilitates new business 2 
Cultural Heterogeneity promotes new business 3 
Research-Business linkages promotes start up 4 
  
Unionized Labor Market obstacles new venture 5 
Rigidity of the technical labor market slackens new 
venture 
4 
Penalizing Bankruptcy law discourages new venture 5 
Corporatist society discourages start ups 3 
“Local mind Culture” doesn’t promote new business 3 
Complex Bureaucracy obstacles business 5 
Tax pressure obstacles new business venture 5 
Traditional conservative culture discourages start up 4 
Inefficient capital market discourages start up 5 
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Political instability obstacles new business venture 2 
Short–term buyer-supplier relationship discourages 
start up 
2 
* 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= not sure; 4= agree; 5=strongly agree  
 
Evidence from the Italian study suggests the prevalence of learning by imitating. In all 
Italian cases considered in this study, learning by imitating prevails over learning by 
trial-and-error independently by the organizational performance and type (start-ups ver-
sus venture capitalists). In fact, learning by imitating is preponderate in both the start-
ups considered, Itadiego (positive track record) and Itamiche (problematic track record). 
For evidence on this see table 6 below. 
 
Table 6 
Summary of Data on learning statements agreement 
Statements Level of Agreement *(mode) 
Procedures defined by start ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley are simple 5 
Procedure defined by start ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley are useful 5 
Procedure defined by start ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley are distinctive 5 
Procedure defined by start ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley are positive 5 
Procedure defined by start ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley are prevalent 4 
I tried to codify rules and procedures adopted by others start-ups/VCs  5 
I often use slogan introduced by start-ups/VCs in the Silicon Valley 3 
I tried to reproduce strategies previously adopted by other start-
ups/VCs  
5 
In a new situation I rely on what other start-ups/VCs did 5 
The fastest way to deal with a problem is looking at others solutions 5 
I rely on the others’ experience 5 
In a new situation I try my own way  2 
I create the actual internal procedures experimenting new solutions 2 
You have to make mistakes in order to learn the right solution 3 
The first think that I do when I face a new problem is calling someone 
who already faced it 
4 
I ask my managers to follow what other start-ups/VCs did at this stage 4 
A failure is a good occasion for learning 2 
A failure is a condition to avoid 5 
My direct experience is fundamental in my new business 3 
Others’ experience is fundamental in my new business 5 
I feel free to try new solutions 2 
I don’t consider other positive experience as my starting point  3 
* 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= not sure; 4= agree; 5=strongly agree  
 
The technical language adopted within these organizations was totally copied from the 
Silicon Valley. The Italian venture capitalists as the start-ups acquired the language 
from reading documents, books, and newspapers or speaking with persons employed in 
the Silicon Valley. They are using the original English version without any translation 
 17
in their native language. But what is more evident is how our informants learned proce-
dures and criteria by imitating. Itadiego founder described the process that brought to 
the definition of the governing procedure of his company as a pure imitating process. 
As he explained, “When the new economy started in Italy, there was an exciting atmos-
phere, but even a clear failure threat. Everyone wanted to enter in the new economy 
founding a start-up. But how you can do it? I had a good business idea. I obtained 
funds. After that, I had to organize my company. I had ideas on what rules and procedu-
res had to be adopted in my business. But I wasn’t sure that they eventually would 
work. I knew, for example, that I had to organize some kind of public relation function 
to relate with investors and potential partners. But I really had no experience in that. 
Thus, I spent some days surfing the web and calling friends in Germany and United Sta-
tes to find out how these kind of things are managed in other countries. I found some 
good practices (at least examples). And I proposed them to our venture capitalist”. 
From above it follows that in the case of Italy our proposition is confirmed, as both 
firms and entrepreneurs operating in environments perceived to be non-friendly to ven-
turing activities are more likely to rely on learning by imitation than by trial-and-error. 
 
VI. Closure 
 
We initiated this paper by arguing that the problems of learning and adaptation repre-
sent a true challenge to the growing number of firms and entrepreneurs involved in the 
new economy. Especially, we suggested that they face a world where; a) the firstcomer 
takes, if not the whole market, then at least the lion’s share of the market, and b) a ra-
pidly changing environment might undermine the opportunities for learning. Hence, we 
suggested that in such an environments entrepreneurs and firms are more likely to solve 
problems by imitation than through direct experience. 
We suggested that firms and entrepreneurs who perceive the institutional settings as 
non-venture friendly are more likely to rely on learning by imitating than by trial and 
error. In this analysis we foremost rely on data from the Italian part of the empirical 
study. The analysis of these data confirms our proposition. 
Knowing that entrepreneurs and firms involved in the new economy are more likely to 
rely on imitation than on direct experience as their learning strategy, we now suggest 
that actors with extensive networks are more likely to survive in the new economy. 
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